Population Ethics and the Value of Life by Blackorby, Charles et al.
Cahier 2003-07
BLACKORBY, Charles
BOSSERT, Walter
DONALDSON, David
Population Ethics and the Value of Life
Département de sciences économiques 
Université de Montréal 
Faculté des arts et des sciences 
C.P. 6128, succursale Centre-Ville 
Montréal (Québec) H3C 3J7 
Canada 
http://www.sceco.umontreal.ca  
SCECO-information@UMontreal.CA 
Téléphone : (514) 343-6539 
Télécopieur : (514) 343-7221 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ce cahier a également été publié par le Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en 
économie quantitative (CIREQ) sous le numéro 05-2003. 
 
This working paper was also published by the Center for Interuniversity Research in 
Quantitative Economics (CIREQ), under number 05-2003. 
 
 
 
ISSN 0709-9231 
Population Ethics and the Value of Life*
Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert and David Donaldson
April 2003 revised July 2003
Abstract. Public policies often involve choices of alternatives in which the size and the
composition of the population may vary. Examples are the allocation of resources to
prenatal care and the design of aid packages to developing countries. In order to assess
the corresponding feasible choices on normative grounds, criteria for social evaluation
that are capable of performing variable-population comparisons are required. We review
several important axioms for welfarist population principles and discuss the link between
individual well-being and the desirability of adding a new person to a given society. Journal
of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers: D63, D71.
Keywords: Population Ethics, Neutrality, Critical Levels.
Charles Blackorby: Department of Economics, University of Warwick and GREQAM,
c.blackorby@warwick.ac.uk
Walter Bossert: De´partement de Sciences Economiques and CIREQ, Universite´ de Montre´al,
walter.bossert@umontreal.ca
David Donaldson: Department of Economics, University of British Columbia,
dvdd@telus.net
* The paper was presented at the United Nations University and World Institute for De-
velopment Economics Research Conference on Inequality, Poverty and Human Well-Being
in Helsinki, May 2003. We thank Conchita D’Ambrosio for comments and suggestions. Fi-
nancial support through a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
of Canada is gratefully acknowledged.
August 8, 2003
1. Introduction
Public policies frequently involve choices of alternatives in which the size and the composi-
tion of the population may vary. Examples are the allocation of resources to prenatal care
and the design of aid packages to developing countries. In order to assess the correspond-
ing feasible choices on normative grounds, criteria for social evaluation that are capable of
ranking alternatives with diﬀerent populations and population sizes are required.
Such criteria, which we call population principles, are extensions of ﬁxed-population
social-evaluation principles. The purpose of this paper is to discuss some of their proper-
ties. In particular, we examine the consequences and the mutual compatibility of several
requirements regarding the addition of individuals to a given society.
The principles discussed in this paper are welfarist: the ranking of any two alternatives
depends on the well-being of those alive in them only. Thus, knowledge of all those who
ever live together with their levels of lifetime utility (interpreted as levels of lifetime well-
being) is suﬃcient to establish a welfarist social ranking. Because of the importance of
utility information, it is important to employ a comprehensive account of well-being such
as that of Griﬃn [1986] or of Sumner [1996]. The interpretation of individual utilities as
indicators of lifetime (as opposed to per-period) well-being is essential to avoid counter-
intuitive recommendations regarding the termination of lives.
For an individual, a neutral life is one which is as good as one in which he or she
has no experiences. Above neutrality, life, as a whole, is worth living; below neutrality,
it is not. Following standard practice, we assign a utility level of zero to neutrality. It
is possible to use other normalizations but, in that case, the deﬁnitions of the principles
discussed here must be adjusted accordingly.
Same-number generalized utilitarianism ranks any two alternatives with the same
population size by comparing their total or average transformed utilities. The transfor-
mation is increasing, continuous and preserves the zero normalization for a neutral life. If
the transformation is strictly concave, the principle is strictly averse to utility inequality,
giving priority to the interests of those whose utility levels are low. There are many ways
of extending same-number generalized utilitarianism to a variable-number framework, and
we call a population principle whose same-number subprinciples are generalized-utilitarian
a same-number generalized-utilitarian principle.
Critical-level generalized utilitarianism (Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [1995,
1997] and Blackorby and Donaldson [1984]) is a class of same-number generalized-utilitarian
principles. Each of its members uses the sum of the diﬀerences between transformed in-
dividual utility levels and a transformed ﬁxed critical level to make comparisons.1 If the
1 Fixed critical levels are proposed by Parfit [1976, 1982, 1984].
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critical level is equal to zero, classical generalized utilitarianism results. For each value of
the critical-level parameter, a diﬀerent principle is obtained.
Parﬁt [1976, 1982, 1984] criticizes classical utilitarianism (the special case of classi-
cal generalized utilitarianism where the transformation is the identity mapping) on the
grounds that it implies the repugnant conclusion. A population principle implies the re-
pugnant conclusion if and only if, for any population size, for any positive level of utility
and for any level of utility strictly between zero and the speciﬁed level, there exists a larger
population size such that an alternative in which everyone in the larger population has
the lower level of utility is better than any alternative with the smaller population and
the higher utility for everyone.2 The higher utility level can be arbitrarily large and the
lower utility level can be arbitrarily close to zero, the level that represents a neutral life.
The generalized counterpart of classical utilitarianism suﬀers from the same problem.
The Pareto plus principle (see Sikora [1978]) extends the strong Pareto principle to
variable-population comparisons. It requires the addition of an individual with a lifetime
utility above neutrality to a utility-unaﬀected population to be ranked as a social im-
provement. In conjunction with several standard conditions, this axiom is inconsistent
with avoidance of the repugnant conclusion. In addition, Pareto plus appears to rest on
the idea that individuals who do not exist—potential people—have interests, a view that
is not easy to defend. Thus, we accept violations of Pareto plus in order to be able to
avoid the repugnant conclusion.
In this paper, we summarize some important aspects of welfarist population ethics
that are discussed in detail in some earlier contributions. In addition, new results analyze
some implications of Pareto plus and avoidance of the repugnant conclusion. Two impossi-
bility theorems regarding the compatibility of Pareto plus and avoidance of the repugnant
conclusion are presented. In response to those impossibilities, we discuss an alternative
to Pareto plus, the negative expansion principle. It requires any alternative to be ranked
as better than an expansion in which no one in the existing population is aﬀected and an
added individual is below neutrality.
In Section 2, we introduce population principles and, as a special case, same-number
generalized utilitarianism. The notions of a neutral life and critical levels are discussed in
Section 3. In addition, we examine the restrictions that are imposed on critical levels by the
Pareto plus principle, avoidance of the repugnant conclusion and the negative expansion
principle. Section 4 presents and discusses critical-level generalized utilitarianism and
Section 5 concludes.
2 Parfit’s statement of the repugnant conclusion is somewhat weaker.
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2. Population principles
A population principle ranks alternatives according to their social goodness. Each social
alternative is a complete history of the world (or universe) and is associated with all infor-
mation that may be relevant to the ranking. In particular, information about individual
well-being is included. The social ranking is assumed to be an ordering, that is, a reﬂexive,
transitive and complete at-least-as-good-as relation. Two alternatives are equally good if
and only if each is at least as good as the other. An alternative is better than another if
and only if it is at least as good and the converse is not true.
A utility distribution consists of the lifetime utility levels of all the people who ever
live in the corresponding alternative. Because we consider anonymous principles only, it is
not necessary to keep track of individual identities. Consequently, the utility levels in an
alternative can be numbered from one to the number of individuals alive. Thus, if there
are n people alive in an alternative, a utility distribution is an n-tuple u = (u1, . . . , un)
where each number in the list is the utility level of one of the members of society. The
utility distribution 1n is a distribution where all n people alive have a utility of one.
We restrict attention to welfarist population principles.3 A principle is welfarist if
and only if there is a single ordering deﬁned on utility distributions that can be used to
rank all alternatives: one alternative is at least as good as another if and only if the utility
distribution corresponding to the ﬁrst is at least as good as the distribution corresponding
to the second according to this ordering. In order to be a population principle, the or-
dering of utility distributions must be capable of diﬀerent-number comparisons: any two
distributions u = (u1, . . . , un) and v = (v1, . . . , vm) are ranked, even if the population
sizes n and m are diﬀerent. Because we consider welfarist principles only, we formulate all
axioms and principles in terms of the ordering of utility distributions.
In this section, we introduce properties of population principles that impose restric-
tions on same-number comparisons only. Our ﬁrst requirement is anonymity: if we relabel
the utility levels in a utility distribution u, the resulting distribution is as good as u.
Such a relabeling is called a permutation of a utility distribution. A permutation of
u = (u1, . . . , un) is a utility distribution v = (v1, . . . , vn) such that there exists a way of
matching each index i in u to exactly one index j in v such that ui = vj . For example,
(u2, u1, u3) is a permutation of (u1, u2, u3).
Anonymity: For all population sizes n, for all utility distributions u = (u1, . . . , un) and
v = (v1, . . . , vn), if v is a permutation of u, then u and v are equally good.
3 See, for example, Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2002b] for a case in favor of welfarist social
evaluation.
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The strong Pareto principle is a ﬁxed-population axiom. If everyone alive in two
distributions u and v has a utility in u that is at least as high as that in v with at least
one strict inequality, u is better than v.
Strong Pareto: For all population sizes n and for all utility distributions u = (u1, . . . , un)
and v = (v1, . . . , vn), if ui ≥ vi for all i with at least one strict inequality, then u is better
than v.
It is possible to criticize strong Pareto on the grounds that increases in some or all
utility levels may increase utility inequality. A weaker principle that avoids this objection
is minimal increasingness. It applies to utility distributions in which all utility levels are
equal and declares increases in the common level to be social improvements.
Minimal increasingness: For all population sizes n and for all utility levels b and d, if
b > d, then b1n is better than d1n.
Continuity is a condition that prevents the goodness relation from exhibiting ‘large’
changes in response to ‘small’ changes in the utility distribution. It rules out ﬁxed-
population principles such as lexicographic maximin (leximin).
Continuity: For all population sizes n, for all utility distributions u = (u1, . . . , un)
and v = (v1, . . . , vn) and for all sequences of utility distributions 〈uj〉j=1,2,... where uj =
(uj1, . . . , u
j
n) for all j,
(a) if the sequence 〈uj〉j=1,2,... approaches v and uj is at least as good as u for all j, then
v is at least as good as u;
(b) if the sequence 〈uj〉j=1,2,... approaches v and u is at least as good as uj for all j, then
u is at least as good as v.
A population principle is weakly inequality averse if and only if it ranks an equal
distribution as at least as good as any distribution which has the same total utility.
Weak inequality aversion: For all population sizes n and for all utility distributions
u = (u1, . . . , un),
(
(
∑n
i=1 ui)/n
)
1n is at least as good as u.
We conclude this section with a deﬁnition of same-number generalized utilitarianism.
The members of this class of principles use the sum of transformed utilities to perform all
same-number comparisons. The transformation applied to individual utilities is the same
for everyone and it is continuous and increasing. Without loss of generality, we assume
that the transformation preserves neutrality, that is, its value at zero is equal to zero.
The principle is minimally inequality-averse if and only if the transformation is concave
and strictly inequality-averse if and only if the transformation is strictly concave. The
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latter case gives priority to the interests of those whose levels of well-being are low (see
Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2002a], Parﬁt [1997], Broome [2003] and Fleurbaey
[2003]). According to same-number generalized utilitarianism with a transformation g, a
utility distribution u = (u1, . . . , un) is at least as good as a distribution v = (v1, . . . , vn)
with the same population size if and only if
n∑
i=1
g(ui) ≥
n∑
i=1
g(vi).
It is easy to verify that same-number generalized utilitarianism satisﬁes all of the same-
number axioms introduced in this section.
3. Population expansions
A life is worth living if and only if it is better, from the viewpoint of the individual leading
it, than a life without any experiences.4 Similarly, a life is not worth living if and only
if it is worse than a life without experiences. A neutral life is one which is neither worth
living nor not worth living. Following the standard normalization employed in population
ethics, we associate a utility level of zero with a neutral life. Thus, if a person has a
positive (negative) level of lifetime well-being, his or her life is (is not) worth living.
Because people who do not exist do not have interests or preferences, it does not
make sense to say that an individual gains by being brought into existence with a utility
level above neutrality. It makes perfect sense, of course, to say that an individual gains
or loses by continuing to live because of surviving a life-threatening illness, say. Such
a change aﬀects length of life, not existence itself.5 We therefore take the view that,
unless an individual is alive in two alternatives, comparisons of individual goodness are
meaningless.6 We follow the standard convention and identify the value of a neutral life
with a lifetime-utility level of zero.
The axioms introduced in the previous section are same-number axioms because they
impose restrictions on same-number comparisons only. One way of establishing links be-
tween utility distributions of diﬀerent dimensions is to assume that, for any distribution of
any population size, there exists a level of utility—the critical level—which, if experienced
by an additional person, leads to a distribution that is equally good, provided that the
utilities of the common population are unchanged. The following axiom postulates the
existence of a critical level for every utility distribution.
4 See Broome [1993].
5 For further discussions, see Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [1997], Heyd [1992, Chapter 1], McMa-
han [1996] and Parfit [1984, Appendix G].
6 See Broome [1993, 1999, Chapter 8], Heyd [1992, Chapter 1], McMahan [1996] and Parfit [1984,
Appendix G].
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Existence of critical levels: For all population sizes n and for all utility distributions
u = (u1, . . . , un), there exists a critical level c such that u and (u, c) = (u1, . . . , un, c) are
equally good.
A critical level c for a utility distribution u is a level of well-being c such that, if an
individual with the critical level is added to u, all other utilities unchanged, the augmented
distribution and the original are equally good. As an immediate consequence of strong
Pareto and transitivity, each utility distribution can have at most one critical level. In
that case, it is possible to deﬁne a critical-level function C which provides a critical level
for every utility distribution. Thus, any distribution u and the distribution (u, C(u)) are
equally good. It follows that the overall ordering of utility distributions is completely
determined by the same-number orderings and the critical-level function.
Sikora [1978] proposes to extend the strong Pareto principle to variable-population
comparisons. He calls the resulting axiom Pareto plus, and it is usually deﬁned as the
conjunction of strong Pareto and the requirement that the addition of an individual above
neutrality to a utility-unaﬀected population is a social improvement. Because we want to
retain strong Pareto as a separate axiom, we state the second part of the condition only.
Pareto plus: For all population sizes n, for all utility distributions u = (u1, . . . , un) and
for all positive utility levels a, (u, a) = (u1, . . . , un, a) is better than u.
In the axiom statement, the common population in u and (u, a) is unaﬀected and, thus,
in order to defend the axiom, it must be argued that a level of well-being above neutrality
is better than non-existence. Thus, the axiom extends the Pareto condition to situations
where a person is not alive in all alternatives that are compared. While it is possible to
compare alternatives with diﬀerent populations from a social point of view (which is the
issue addressed in population ethics), it is questionable to make such a comparison from
the viewpoint of an individual if the person is not alive in one of the alternatives. It is
therefore diﬃcult to interpret this axiom as a Pareto condition because it appears to be
based on the idea that people who do not exist have interests that should be respected.
There is, therefore, an important asymmetry that applies to the assessment of al-
ternatives with diﬀerent populations. Although it is perfectly reasonable to say that an
individual considers his or her life worth living if he or she is alive with a positive level
of lifetime well-being, it does not make sense to say that a person who does not exist
gains from being brought into existence with a life above neutrality: such a person cannot
experience gains or losses.
The following result illustrates the requirements on critical levels imposed by Pareto
plus, provided strong Pareto and existence of critical levels are satisﬁed. Not surprisingly,
Pareto plus is equivalent to the requirement that all critical levels be non-positive.
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Theorem 1: Suppose that an anonymous population principle satisﬁes strong Pareto
and existence of critical levels. The principle satisﬁes Pareto plus if and only if all critical
levels are non-positive.
Proof. Suppose all critical levels are non-positive. By existence of critical levels and
strong Pareto, critical levels are unique and the critical-level function C is well-deﬁned.
By deﬁnition of a critical level, u and (u, C(u)) are equally good for all utility distributions
u. Let a be a positive utility level. Because all critical levels are non-positive, it follows
that a > 0 ≥ C(u) and, thus, a > C(u). By strong Pareto, (u, a) is better than (u, C(u))
and, because (u, C(u)) and u are equally good, transitivity implies that (u, a) is better
than u. Thus, Pareto plus is satisﬁed.
Now suppose there exists a utility distribution u such that the critical level C(u)
for u is positive. By deﬁnition, (u, C(u)) and u are equally good. Let a be such that
0 < a < C(u). Strong Pareto implies that (u, C(u)) is better than (u, a). Using transitivity
again, it follows that u is better than (u, a) and, thus, Pareto plus is violated because a is
positive.
Another property that imposes restrictions on variable-population comparisons is
avoidance of the repugnant conclusion. A principle leads to the repugnant conclusion
(Parﬁt [1976, 1982, 1984]) if population size can always be substituted for quality of life,
no matter how close to neutrality the well-being of a large population is. That is, there are
situations where mass poverty is considered better than some alternatives in which fewer
people lead very good lives. We share Parﬁt’s view regarding the unacceptability of the
repugnant conclusion and we therefore require a population principle to avoid it.
Avoidance of the repugnant conclusion: There exist a population size n, a positive
utility level ξ and a utility level ε strictly between zero and ξ such that, for all population
sizes m > n, a utility distribution in which each of n individuals has the utility level ξ is
at least as good as a utility distribution in which each of m individuals has a utility of ε.
An important criticism of Pareto plus is that all anonymous, weakly inequality-averse
population principles that satisfy it lead to the repugnant conclusion. Similar theorems can
be found in Blackorby, Bossert, Donaldson and Fleurbaey [1998], Blackorby and Donaldson
[1991], Carlson [1998], McMahan [1981] and Parﬁt [1976, 1982, 1984].
Theorem 2: There exists no anonymous population principle that satisﬁes minimal
increasingness, weak inequality aversion, Pareto plus and avoidance of the repugnant con-
clusion.
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Proof. Suppose that an anonymous population principle satisﬁes minimal increasingness,
weak inequality aversion and Pareto plus. For any population size n, let ξ, ε and δ be
utility levels such that 0 < δ < ε < ξ. Choose the integer r such that
r > n
(ξ − ε)
(ε− δ) . (1)
Because the numerator and denominator are both positive, r is positive. By Pareto plus,
(ξ1n, δ1r) is better than ξ1n. Average utility in (ξ1n, δ1r) is (nξ + rδ)/(n + r) so, by
minimal inequality aversion, [(nξ + rδ)/(n+ r)]1n+r is at least as good as (ξ1n, δ1r). By
(1),
ε >
nξ + rδ
n+ r
and, by minimal increasingness, ε1n+r is better than [(nξ+ rδ)/(n+ r)]1n+r. Using tran-
sitivity, it follows that ε1n+r is better than ξ1n and avoidance of the repugnant conclusion
is violated.
If weak inequality aversion is dropped from the list of axioms in Theorem 2, the
remaining axioms are compatible. For example, a principle proposed by Sider [1991]
which he calls geometrism satisﬁes minimal increasingness, Pareto plus and avoidance of
the repugnant conclusion. It uses a positive constant k between zero and one which and
ranks alternatives with a weighted sum of utilities: the jth-highest non-negative utility
level receives a weight of kj−1 and the lth-lowest negative utility receives a weight of kl−1.
Critical levels are all zero and the repugnant conclusion is avoided but, because weights
on higher positive utilities exceed weights on lower ones, the principle prefers inequality
of positive utilities over equality (see Arrhenius and Bykvist [1995]).
If a population principle is same-number generalized-utilitarian, the inequality-aversion
requirement of Theorem 2 can be dropped.
Theorem 3: There exists no same-number generalized-utilitarian population principle
that satisﬁes Pareto plus and avoidance of the repugnant conclusion.
Proof. Suppose that a same-number generalized-utilitarian population principle satisﬁes
Pareto plus. For any population size n, let ξ, ε and δ be utility levels such that 0 < δ <
ε < ξ. Choose the integer r such that
r > n
[
g(ξ)− g(ε)][
g(ε)− g(δ)] . (2)
Because g is increasing, the numerator and denominator of (2) are both positive and,
therefore, r is positive. (2) implies that
(n+ r)g(ε) > ng(ξ) + rg(δ)
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so, by same-number generalized utilitarianism, ε1n+r is better than (ξ1n, δ1r). By Pareto
plus, (ξ1n, δ1r) is better than ξ1n and, by transitivity, ε1n+r is better than ξ1n. Conse-
quently, avoidance of the repugnant conclusion is violated.
We now show that anonymous population principles that satisfy strong Pareto, weak
inequality aversion, existence of critical levels and avoidance of the repugnant conclusion
must have at least one positive critical level.
Theorem 4: If an anonymous population principle satisﬁes strong Pareto, weak inequal-
ity aversion, existence of critical levels and avoidance of the repugnant conclusion, then
there exists a utility distribution u with a positive critical level.
Proof. Suppose that an anonymous population principle satisﬁes strong Pareto, weak
inequality aversion, existence of critical levels and avoidance of the repugnant conclusion.
Then all critical levels exist and are unique. Now suppose that all critical levels are non-
positive. Theorem 1 implies that Pareto plus is satisﬁed and, because strong Pareto implies
minimal increasingness, Theorem 2 implies that avoidance of the repugnant conclusion is
violated, a contradiction. Therefore, there must be at least one utility distribution u with
a positive utility level.
A variant of Theorem 4 shows that same-number generalized-utilitarian principles
that satisfy existence of critical levels and avoidance of the repugnant conclusion must
have some positive critical levels. Because the proof uses Theorems 1 and 3 and is similar
to the proof of Theorem 4, it is omitted.
Theorem 5: If a same-number generalized-utilitarian population principle satisﬁes exis-
tence of critical levels and avoidance of the repugnant conclusion, then there exists a utility
distribution u with a positive critical level.
The negative expansion principle is the dual version of Pareto plus. It requires any
utility distribution to be ranked as better than one with the ceteris-paribus addition of an
individual whose life is not worth living.
Negative expansion principle: For all population sizes n, for all utility distributions
u = (u1, . . . , un) and for all negative utility levels a, u is better than (u, a) = (u1, . . . , un, a).
If a population principle satisﬁes strong Pareto and all critical levels exist, this axiom
requires them to be non-negative. Because the theorem is parallel to Theorem 1, it is not
proved.
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Theorem 6: Suppose that an anonymous population principle satisﬁes strong Pareto
and existence of critical levels. The principle satisﬁes the negative expansion principle if
and only if all critical levels are non-negative.
There are many population principles that satisfy minimal increasingness, weak in-
equality aversion, the negative expansion principle and avoidance of the repugnant con-
clusion. Among these are all of the critical-level generalized-utilitarian principles with
positive critical levels.
The negative expansion principle does rule out some principles that avoid the repug-
nant conclusion, however. If average utility is negative, average utilitarianism approves of
the ceteris-paribus addition of a person with a negative utility level above the average. If
all critical levels exist, all same-number generalized-utilitarian principles with some nega-
tive critical levels are similarly ruled out. These include the number-dampened utilitarian
principles (Ng [1986]) other than classical utilitarianism and their generalized counterparts
(see Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2003]).
4. Critical-level generalized utilitarianism
If strong Pareto is satisﬁed, a critical level represents a minimally acceptable level of utility
such that the ceteris-paribus addition of a single individual with a greater lifetime utility
is a social improvement. Because no one in the existing population is aﬀected, it is natural
to choose a constant critical-level function.
This choice is implied by adding a weakening of existence of critical levels and an
independence condition to the same-number axioms introduced earlier. Existence inde-
pendence requires the ranking of any two utility distributions to be independent of the
existence (and, thus, the utilities) of individuals who have the same utility levels in both.
A principle that satisﬁes this condition is capable of performing comparisons by restricting
attention to aﬀected individuals—the utilities of the unconcerned are irrelevant to establish
the ranking of utility distributions.
Existence independence: For all population sizes n,m, r and for all utility distributions
u = (u1, . . . , un), v = (v1, . . . , vm) and w = (w1, . . . , wr), the utility distribution (u, w) is
at least as good as the utility distribution (v, w) if and only if u is at least as good as v.
Existence of critical levels can be weakened to the following requirement. Unlike the
stronger axiom, it requires the existence of only one critical level.
Weak existence of critical levels: There exist a utility distribution u = (u1, . . . , un)
and a utility level c such that u and (u, c) = (u1, . . . , un, c) are equally good.
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According to critical-level generalized utilitarianism, utility distribution u = (u1, . . . , un)
is at least as good as distribution v = (v1, . . . , vm) if and only if
n∑
i=1
[
g(ui)− g(α)
] ≥
m∑
i=1
[
g(vi)− g(α)
]
,
where α is a ﬁxed critical level. Without loss of generality, we can again assume that
the continuous and increasing transformation g preserves the utility level representing
neutrality, that is, it satisﬁes g(0) = 0. Classical generalized utilitarianism is obtained
for the special case where the critical-level parameter α is equal to zero, the utility level
representing a neutral life.
A subclass of the critical-level generalized-utilitarian class is the critical-level utilitar-
ian (CLU) class in which the transformation g is the identity mapping. According to CLU,
utility distribution u = (u1, . . . , un) is at least as good as distribution v = (v1, . . . , vm) if
and only if
n∑
i=1
[ui − α] ≥
m∑
i=1
[vi − α],
where α is a ﬁxed critical level. Classical utilitarianism is obtained when α = 0.
The critical-level generalized-utilitarian (CLGU) principles are the only ones that
satisfy the axioms anonymity, strong Pareto, continuity, existence independence and weak
existence of critical levels. If the negative expansion principle is added, the ﬁxed critical
level must be non-negative and, if avoidance of the repugnant conclusion is added instead,
the critical level must be positive. This result, which is proved in Blackorby, Bossert and
Donaldson [1998], provides a strong case in favour of the CLGU principles with positive
critical levels.7 Because we consider the repugnant conclusion unacceptable, we add its
avoidance to the list of axioms to obtain a characterization of the subclass of critical-level
generalized-utilitarian principles with a positive critical level.
Theorem 7: A welfarist population principle satisﬁes anonymity, strong Pareto, con-
tinuity, existence independence, weak existence of critical levels and avoidance of the re-
pugnant conclusion if and only if it is critical-level generalized-utilitarian with a positive
critical level α.
If, in Theorem 7, avoidance of the repugnant conclusion is replaced with Pareto plus
and the negative expansion principle, a characterization of classical generalized utilitari-
anism results.
7 See also Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [1995] for an intertemporal formulation. An alternative
characterization can be found in Blackorby and Donaldson [1984].
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Theorem 8: A welfarist population principle satisﬁes anonymity, strong Pareto, conti-
nuity, existence independence, weak existence of critical levels, Pareto plus and the negative
expansion principle if and only if it is classical generalized-utilitarian.
5. Conclusion
Parﬁt [1976, 1982, 1984] argues that the repugnant conclusion should be avoided and we
concur. Because all reasonable population principles that satisfy Pareto plus lead to the
repugnant conclusion (Theorems 2 and 3), we reject Pareto plus.
An ethically attractive alternative to Pareto plus is the negative expansion principle.
It prevents the ceteris-paribus addition of a person whose life is not worth living from being
ranked as a social improvement. It requires critical levels, if they exist, to be non-negative
and, in addition, is compatible with avoidance of the repugnant conclusion. It also rules
out some principles, such as average utilitarianism, that do not lead to the repugnant
conclusion.
It is important that lifetime utilities rather than per-period utilities are considered
if principles with positive critical levels are employed. This means that, contrary to a
widespread misconception, the termination of a life does not change population size: in-
stead, it changes the aﬀected person’s lifetime and may change her or his lifetime utility.
Thus, a positive critical level does not recommend that a life with a lifetime utility between
zero and the critical level should be terminated. Suppose we use critical-level utilitarian-
ism with a critical level of two. Consider ﬁrst a situation where two individuals are alive,
one with a lifetime utility of four, the other with a lifetime utility of one. The sum of
utility gains over the critical level is (4 − 2) + (1 − 2) = 1. Now suppose terminating
the second person’s life would reduce her or his lifetime utility to zero. In this case, the
relevant sum is (4− 2) + (0− 2) = 0 and, thus, this alternative is worse. Note that, once
a person exists, the person has full moral standing and his or her utility must count in
the criterion for social evaluation. Suppose now that the ﬁrst person is the only one alive
and we ask whether a new person with a lifetime utility of one should be brought into
being. The one-person society has a sum of utility gains of (4− 2) = 2 and if the second
person is brought into existence, the corresponding sum is (4− 2)+ (1− 2) = 1 and, thus,
it is better that the second (non-existing) person not be born. The diﬀerent treatment
of existing and non-existing individuals in this example cannot be obtained if the critical
level is equal to zero.
The critical-level generalized-utilitarian principles with positive critical levels are not
the only ones that satisfy anonymity, strong Pareto, continuity, existence of critical levels,
avoidance of the repugnant conclusion and the negative expansion principle. However, all
of the others that do necessarily violate existence independence. Because space constraints
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prevent us from examining them here, we refer the interested reader to Blackorby, Bossert
and Donaldson [2003].
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